In his famous essay "The Transition from an Aristotelean
to a Galilean Way of Thinking in Biology and Psychology" (LEWIN 1931),
Kurt LEWIN recommends two necessary steps for psychological research which
are connected with each other in science theory:
- the transition from non-personal to field theoretical (situational, relational)
applications;
- the transition from a character centered to a function centered explanation
of psychic phenonema.
In my lecture I pursue the question of whether or not FREUD and his followers,
and also whether LEWIN himself and his school, have completed this transition.
In 1934 J.F. BROWN, a student of LEWIN, wrote that "FREUD'S psychoanalysis
fulfills some of the criteria for field theory, some for class theory, and
with regard to some criteria is a mixture of the two types of theory."
In regarding the difference between his topological psychology and psychoanalysis,
LEWIN himself was of the opinion that the former understands all occurrences
as emerging out of the totality of the life space, and accordingly, considers
the person and the environment, whereas psychoanalysis concerns itself primarily
with the person. METZGER was even more radical on this point. Although FREUD
was the first to observe a person no longer as a psychological aggregate,
but rather as a system, his concepts remain, nonetheless, solipsistic because
for him "the borders of the dynamic system man were the same as the borders
of the organism".
The psychoanalyst RICHTER also came to the conclusion that FREUD's developmental
teachings rest on an individualistic model of thought, one related to the
cognitive model of organ medicine. This is unreasonable in the psychological
realm of human beings, as they are necessarily involved primarily with other
human beings, not predominantly with biochemical or biophysical spheres.
One can then say: While with FREUD the therapeutic treatment rests on relational
and dialogical methods, his theory contains building blocks impressed with
monopersonal concepts.
Some disciples of FREUD have, nonetheless, overcome this inconsistency between
theory and practice by using a relational model. I would like to mention
just two directions:
- the narrative-linguistic direction, which employs narrative and
linguistic theories in the analytical discussion;
- the dramaturgical direction (for example, Horst Eberhard RICHTER)
which uses concepts of scenes, roles, etc. in order to represent the relationship
of the patient to the therapist and to his or her environment.
Also to be mentioned here:
- The french psychoanalysts Madelaine and Willy BARANGER, working in Argentina,
who view the patient and the therapist as complementary pair and propose
to described it with the field model.
- The recommendation from Giancarlo TROMBINI, professor for clinical psychology
in Bologna, who, in following the example of METZGER, describes the organization
of the analytical pair by using the concept of the step structure and the
ring structure, and examines the conditions and function of such structures.
In my lecture I consider finally the question of whether LEWIN consequently
applied the field-theoretical approach in his own psychology. My opinion
is that neither LEWIN nor FREUD satisfactorily solved the relationship between
theory and practice. Certainly, his theory contains relational character,
but nonetheless, his method lacks in dialogical character.
These inadequacies spring from different grounds:
1.) because the experience of the test subject is sometimes not thematized
by the tester,
2.) because the structure of the field in the experimental situation does
not allow the deeper levels of the person to be reached.
In regards to point one: let me cite the well know work of Bluma ZEIGARNIK
as well as her necessary corrector Erika JUNKER, that the better remembering
is not determined by not-being-finished but rather by not-being-right. In
regards to this, I would like to note that the emphasis of the theory was
here displaced too far along the object pole (the task structure) in the
whole field, with the consequence that the interest in the person slipped
into the background; in general, theory was given too much weight to the
debit of the dialogical method.
In regards to point two: in comparison, the application of the field theory
seems to have been completely achieved in another investigation from this
research series -- that is in the work of Tamara DEMBO on anger. Here all
of the variables of the field are examined: those related to the task, those
related to the person and those related to the person-environment relation.
The method includes not only the observations of behaviour but also the
conversation with the test subject. Only then could important phenomena
be brought to light such as: level of aspiration, substitution, going out
of the field, reality layers, etc. The experimental situation is not, however,
well suited to reaching the deep layers of the person, nor to really portraying
the concrete structure of the psychic person with its inner dynamic facts,
as LEWIN claims in his methodological essay. In my research of the phenomenal
Ego (GALLI 1980, 1982), I was able to confirm--in opposition to LEWIN's
opinion--that the test subject can not open up in the experimental situation
in order to serve the research goals of the tester.
LEWIN postulated the necessity in psychology to cross over from an explanation
of character (Wesenserklärung) to a function centered explanation. For example,
he found the concept of the "terrible two's" (stubborn age) and also the
psychoanalytical notions of drives lacking in that they have the character
of an Aristotelean explanation of character and in essence are achieved
through the abstract selection of similarities of a group of relatively
common occurences. The abstractly defined class is seen as the essence,
and seen as apt to precisely explaining the behaviour of the individual
entity.
In the area of Gestalt theory character explanations were taken over by
function centered explanations, for example, in the work by Tamara DEMBO
which was already mentioned, and in the investigation of early childhood
defiance done by Lilly KEMMLER, a student of METZGER. With the aid of field
theoretical applications, KEMMLER was able to avoid the character explanation
and explain the dynamic of defiance by identifying the person and environmental
factors and their function in the whole situation.
There are also examples for function centered explanations gaining prominence
in contemporary psychoanalysis. I am limiting myself here to the transference
phenomen. Although FREUD analyzed yet purely from monopersonal perspective,
the dramaturgical as well as the narrative-linguistic post-Freudian direction
of psychoanalysis offer a completely different conception. In following
both of these directions, the roles of the two participants, participating
patient and therapist, are built on the here and now of the analytical situation.
The question is no longer: why does the patient behave so or so, why does
he say this or that?, but rather, why does he behave so with the therapist,
or, why does he tell that to the therapist?