|
Editing
and Design: Lidija Rangelovska | A Narcissus Publications Imprint,
Skopje 2003 (fonte
| Translate
this Page! )
|
|
"(There is a growing tendency among foreign observers) to identify the criminal with the honest, the vandal with the civilized, the mafiosi with the nation.'' Former Albanian President Sali Berisha "They were terrorists in 1998 and now, because of politics, they're freedom fighters" Jerry Seper, quoting an anonymous "top drug official" who refers to a 1998 State Department report, in the article "KLA Finances War with Heroin Sales", Washington Times, May 3, 1999 "The Albanian villages are much better, much richer than the Serbian ones. The Serbs, even the rich ones, don't build fine houses in villages where there are Albanians. If a Serb has a two-story house he refrains from painting it so that it shan't look better than the Albanian houses."Leon Trotsky, War Correspondent for "Pravda", reporting from the Balkan Wars, 1912-3 "When spring
comes, we will manure the plains of Kosovo with the bones of Serbs,
for we, Albanians, have suffered too much to forget." Isa
Boletini, leaving the Ambassadors Conference in London, 1913 "Instead of using their authority and impartiality to restrain terrorist gangs of Albanian extremists, we face the situation in which the terrorism is taking place under their auspices, and even being financed by United Nations means"Milosevic, March 2000 "Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation."Ernest Renan, French historian "We spent the 1990's worrying about a Greater Serbia. That's finished. We are going to spend time well into the next century worrying about a Greater Albania."Christopher Hill, Ambassador to Macedonia, 1999 "There is no excuse for that, even if the Serbs in Kosovo are very angry. I accept responsibility. One of the most important tasks of a democracy is to protect its minorities."Milosevic to Ambassador Hill who reported to him about atrocities in Kosovo "I am like a candle. I am melting away slowly, but I light the way for others."Adem Demaci, political representative of the KLA BEFORE The founding fathers of the KLA were Ibrahim Rugova, the pacifist president of the self-proclaimed "Kosovo Republic", established in 1991 - and Slobodan Milosevic, his belligerent Yugoslav counterpart. The abysmal failure of the Gandhiesque policies of the former to shelter his people from the recrudescently violent actions of the latter - revived the fledging KLA outfit. Contrary to typically shallow information in the media, the KLA has been known to have operated in Kosovo as early as the attack on policemen in Glogovac in May 1993. Its epiphany, in the form of magnificently uniformed fighters, occurred only on November 28, 1997 (in the funeral of a teacher, a victim of Serb zealousness) - but it existed long before. Perhaps as long as the People's Movement of Kosovo, founded in 1982. The historical and cultural roots of the conflict in Kosovo were described elsewhere ("The Bad Blood of Kosovo"). Reading that article is essential as this one assumes prior acquaintance with it. Kosovo is a land
of great mineral wealth and commensurate agricultural poverty. It
has always languished with decrepit infrastructure and irrelevant
industry. Kosovo's mineral riches were looted by Yugoslavia
for decades and both Macedonia and Kosovo were the poor relatives
in the Yugoslav Federation. In Kosovo, more than 31% of all those over 10 years of age were illiterate (in 1979) and its per capita income was less than 30% of the national average. Infant mortality was 6 times that in Slovenia. Kosovo was an African enclave in an otherwise Europe-aspiring country. Caught in the pernicious spiral of declining commodity prices, Kosovo relied on transfers from Yugoslavia and from abroad for more than 90% of its income. Inevitably, unemployment tripled from 19% in 1971 to 57% in 1989. As a result, the Federal government had to quell 3-months long, paralysing riots in 1981. Riots were nothing new to Kosovo - the demonstrations of 1968 were arguably worse (and led to constitutional changes granting autonomy to Kosovo in 1974). But this time, the authorities, reacted with tanks in scenes reminiscent of China's Tiananmen Square 8 years later. The hotbed of hotheads was, as usual, the University in Pristina. Students there were more concerned with pedestrian issues such the quality of their food and the lack of facilities than with any eternal revolutionary or national truths. These mundane protests were hijacked by comrades with higher class consciousness and loftier motives of self-determination. Such hijacking, though, would have petered out had the cesspool of rage and indignation not been festering so ebulliently. Serb insensitivity backed by indiscriminate brutality led to escalation. As the years passed, calls for the restoration of the 1974 constitution (under which Kosovo was granted political, financial, legal and cultural autonomy and institutions) - merged into a sonorous agenda of "Great Albania" and a "Kosovo Republic". The Kosovar crowd was never above beatings, looting and burning. The hate was strong. Yugoslavia's ruling party - the League of Communists - was in the throes of its own transformation. With Tito's demise and the implosion of the Soviet Bloc, the Communists lacked both compass and leader. His natural successors were purged by Tito in the 1960s and 1970s. The party wasn't sure whether to turn to Gorbachev's East or to America's West. The Communists panicked and embarked on a rampage of imprisonment, unjust dismissals of Albanians (mainly of teachers, journalists, policemen and judges) and the occasional torture or murder. Serb intellectuals regarded this as no more than the rectification of Tito's anti-Serb policies. Serbia was the only Republic within the Federation, who was dismembered into autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina). "Getting back at Tito" was a strong motive, commensurate with Serb "the world is against us" paranoia and siege mentality. Milosevic, visibly ill at ease, surfed this tide of religion-tinged nationalism straight into Kosovo, the historical heartland of Serb-ism. Oppression breeds
resistance and Serb oppression served only to streamline the stochastic
nationalist movement into a compartmentalized, though factious, underground
organization with roots wherever Albanians resided: Germany, Switzerland,
the USA, Canada and Australia. The ideology was an improbable mix
of Stalinism (Enver Hoxha-inspired), Maoism and Albanian chauvinism.
This was before Albania opened up to reveal its decrepitude and desolation
to its Kosovar visitors. All delusions of an Albania-backed armed
rebellion evaporated in the languor of Albania proper. Thus, the activities
of the Nationalists were more innocuous than their concocted doctrines. They defaced government buildings, shattered gravestones in Serb cemeteries and overturned heroic monuments. The distribution of subversive (and fairly bromide) "literature" was rarely accompanied by acts of terror, either in Kosovo or in Europe. Nationalism is
refuge from uncertainty. As the old Yugoslavia was crumbling, each
of its constituents developed its own brand of escapism, replete with
revenant nationalist leaders, mostly fictional "history",
a newly discovered language and a pledge to fate to reconstitute a
lost empire at its apex. Thus, Kosovar nationalism was qualitatively
the kin and kith of the Serb or Croat sub-species. Paradoxically,
though rather predictably, they fed on each other. Milosevic was as
much a creation of Kosovar nationalism as Thaci was the outcome of
Milosevic's policies. The KLA's Stalinist-Maoist inspiration was in
emulation of the paranoid and omphaloskeptic regime in Albania - but
it owed its existence to Belgrade's intransigence. The love-hate relationship
between the Kosovars and the Albanians is explored elsewhere ("The Myths of Great Albania -Part
I"). The Serbs, in other words, were as terrified of Kosovar
irredentism as the Kosovars were of Serb dominion. Their ever more
pressing and menacing appeals to Belgrade gave the regime the pretext
it needed to intervene and Milosevic the context he sought in which
to flourish. In February 1989, armed with a new constitution which abolished Kosovo's autonomy (and, a year later, its stunned government), Milosevic quelled a miners' hunger strike and proceeded to institute measures of discrimination against the Albanians in the province. Discrimination was nothing new to Kosovo. The Albanians themselves initiated such anti-Serb measures following their new gained constitutional autonomy in 1974. Now the tide has turned and thousands of Albanians who refused to sign new-fangled "loyalty vows" were summarily sacked and lost their pension rights (the most sacred possession of "Homo Socialismus"). Albanian media were shuttered and schools vacated when teacher after teacher refused to abide by the Serb curriculum. After a while, The Serbs re-opened primary schools and re-hired Albanian teachers, allowing them to teach in Albanian. But secondary schools and universities remained closed. These acts of persecution did not meet with universal disapproval. Greece, for instance, regarded the Albanians as natural allies of the Turks and, bonded by common enmity, of the Macedonians and Bulgarians. Itself comprised of lands claimed by Albania, Greece favoured a harsh and final resolution of the Albanian question. There can be little doubt that Macedonia - feeling besieged by its Albanian minority - regarded Milosevic as the perfect antidote. Macedonia actively assisted Yugoslavia to break the embargo imposed on it by the Western powers. Milosevic was not, therefore, a pariah, as retroactive history would have it. Rather, he was the only obstacle to a "Great Albania". Within less than a year, in 1990, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was able to claim a membership of 700,000 members. Hashim Thaci ("Snake"), Sulejman Selimi ("Sultan") and other leaders of the KLA were then 20 years of age. Years of Swiss education notwithstanding, they witnessed first hand Kosovo's tumultuous transformation into the engine of disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. It was a valuable lesson in the dialectic of history, later to be applied brilliantly. The leader of
the LDK, the forever silk scarfed and mellifluous Dr. Ibrahim Rugova,
compared himself openly and blushlessly to Vaclav Havel and the Kosovar
struggle to the Velvet Revolution. This turgid and risible analogy
deteriorated further as the Kosovar Velvet was stained by the blood
of innocents. Dr. Rugova was an unfazed dreamer in a land of harsh
nightmares. The Sorbonne was never a good preparatory school to the
academy of Balkan reality. Rugova's ideals were good and noble - Gandhi-like
passive resistance, market economics, constructive (though uncompromising
and limited to the authorities) dialogue with the enemy. They might
still prevail. And during the early 1990s he was all the rage and
the darling of the West. But he failed to translate his convictions
into tangible achievements. His biggest failure might have been his
inability to ally himself with a "Big Power" - as did the
Croats, the Slovenes and the Bosnians. This became painfully evident
with the signature of the Dayton Accord in 1995 which almost completely
ignored Kosovo and the Kosovars. True, the West
conditioned the total removal of sanctions against Yugoslavia on its
humane treatment of its Albanian citizens and encouraged the Albanians,
though circumspectly, to stand for their rights. But there was no
explicit support even for the re-instatement of Kosovo's 1974 status,
let alone for the Albanians' dreams of statehood. In the absence of
such support - financial and diplomatic - Kosovo remained an internal
problem of Yugoslavia, a renegade province, a colony of terror and
drug trafficking. The Kosovars felt betrayed as they have after the
Congress of Berlin and the Balkan Wars. Perhaps securing such a sponsor
was a lost cause to start with (though the KLA succeeded where Rugova
failed) - but then Rugova misled his people into sanguinous devastation
by declaring the "Kosovo Republic" prematurely. His choice
of pacifism may have been dictated by the sobering sights from the
killing fields of Bosnia - and proved his pragmatism. But his decision
to declare a "Republic" was pre-mature, self-aggrandizing
and in vacuo. The emergence of a political alternative - tough, realistic,
methodical and structured - was not only a question of time but a
welcome development. There is no desolation like the one inflicted
by sincere idealists. In 1991, Rugova
set about organizing a Republic from a shabby office building and
the opposite "Cafe Mimoza". His government constructed makeshift
schools and hospitals, parallel networks of services staffed by the
Serb-dispossessed, capitalizing on a sweeping wave of volunteerism.
Albania recognized this nascent state immediately and international
negotiators (such as Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance) conferred with its
self-important figurehead (for instance, in September 1992). Successive
American administrations funnelled money into the province and warnings
against "ethnic cleansing" were flung at Yugoslavia as early
as 1993. Internally, Serb extremists in both Belgrade and Pristina
prevented Serb moderates (like then Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan
Panic) from re-opening the schools of Kosovo and reducing the massive,
Northern-Ireland-like Serb military presence in it. An agreement signed
in 1997 by both Rugova and Milosevic to abolish the parallel Albanian
education system and re-open all the educational facilities in Kosovo
was thus frustrated. Kosovo fractured along ethnic lines with complete
segregation of the Serbs and the Albanians. To avoid contact with
the Serbs was an unwritten rule, breached only by prominent intellectuals.
The "Kosovo Republic" was far from advocating ethnic cleansing
or even outright independence (there were powerful voices in favour
of a federal solution within Yugoslavia) - but not far from re-inventing
an inverted version of apartheid. It faced the ubiquitous problem of all the other republics of former Yugoslavia - not one of them was ethnically "pure". To achieve a tolerable level of homogeneity, they had to resort to force. Rugova advocated the measured application of the insidious powers of discrimination and segregation. But, once the theme was set, variations were bound to arise. Though dominant
for some years, Rugova and the LDK did not monopolize the Kosovar
political landscape. Following a poll in 1998, boycotted by all other
political parties, which resulted in the re-election of Rugova as
president - the disenchanted and disillusioned had plenty of choice.
Some joined the KLA, many more joined Rexhep Qosaj's (Qosje) United
Democratic Movement (LBD). The political scene in Kosovo in the 1980s
and early 1990s was vibrant and kaleidoscopic. Adem Demaci - the Marxist
ideologue of the KLA, a long time political prisoner and the founder
of the "revolutionary Movement for the Merger of Albanians"
in 1964 - established the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK) before
he handed it over to Bajram Kosumi, a dissident and another venerable
political prisoner. The PPK was co-founded by Veton Surroi, the English-speaking,
US-educated, son of a Yugoslav diplomat and editor of Koha Ditore,
the Albanian language daily. The Albanians are not a devout lot, but
even Islam had its political manifestations in Kosovo. The 1981 demonstrations
gave rise to the Popular Movement for Kosovo (LPK). Apparently, it
gave rise to the KLA, probably in 1993, possibly in Pristina. Whatever
the circumstances, the KLA congregated in Decani, the region surrounding
Pristina. Two years after the Golgovac attack - it tackled a Serb
border patrol (April) and a Serb Police Station (August) in 1995.
Light weapons and a crude bomb were used. The Serbs were not impressed
- but they were provoked into an escalating series of ever more hideous
massacres of Albanian villagers (the turning point might have been
the slaughter by the Serbs of the Jashari clan in Prekaz). Machiavellian
analysts ascribe to the KLA a devilish plot to provoke the Serbs into
the ethnic cleansing that finally introduced the West to tortured
Kosovo. The author of this article, aware of the Balkan's lack of
propensity for long term planning and predilection for self-defeating
vengeance - believes that, to the KLA, it was all a serendipitous
turn of events. Whatever the case may be, the KLA became sufficiently
self-assured and popular to advertise itself on the BBC as responsible
for some of the clashes - a rite of passage common to all self-respecting
freedom fighters. The selection
of targets by the KLA is very telling. At first it concentrated its
fiery intentions only upon military and law and order personnel. Its
reluctance to effect civilians was meritorious. A subtle shift occurred
when the Serbs began to re-populate Kosovo with Serbs displaced from
the Krajina region. Alarmed by the intent - if not by the execution
(only 10,000 Serbs or so were settled in Kosovo) - the KLA reacted
with a major drive to arm itself and by attacking Serb settlements
in Klina, Decani and Djakovica and a refugee camp in Baboloc. The
KLA attacks were militarily sophisticated and co-ordinated. Serb policemen
were ambushed on the road between Glogovac and Srbica. The Serb counter-offensive
resulted in dozens of Albanian victims - civilians, men, women and
children (the "Drenica Massacre"). The KLA tried to defend
villages aligned along a Pec-Djakovica line and thus disrupt the communications
and logistics of Serb Military Police and Special (Ministry of Interior)
Police units. The main arena of fighting was a recurrent one - in
the 1920s, Albanian guerillas, based in the hills, attacked the Serbs
in Drenica. What finally transformed the KLA from a wannabe IRA into the fighting force that it has become was the disintegration of Albania. History is the annals of irony. The break-up of the KLA'a role model - led to the resurgence of its intellectual progeny. The KLA absorbed thousands of weapons from the looted armouries of the Albanian military and police. Angry mobs attacked these ordnances following the collapse of pyramid investment schemes that robbed one third of the population of all their savings. The arms ended up in the trigger-happy hands of drug lords, mafiosi, pimps, smugglers and freedom fighters from Tetovo in Macedonia to Durres in Albania and from Pristina in Kosovo to the Sandzak in Serbia. The KLA was so ill-equipped to cope with this fortuitous cornucopia - that it began to trade weapons, a gainful avocation it found hard to dislodge ever since. The convulsive dissolution of Albania led to changes in high places. Sali Berisha was deposed and replaced by Rexhep Mejdani, an even more sympathetic ear to separatist demands. Berisha himself later allowed the KLA to use his property (around Tropoja) as staging grounds and supported the cause (though not the "Marxist-Leninist" KLA or its self-appointed government) unequivocally. At a certain stage,
he even accused Fatos Nano, his rival and the Prime Minister of Albania
of being the enemy of the Albanian people for not displaying the same
unmitigated loyalty to the idea of an independent Kosovo, under Rugova
and Bujar Bukoshi, Rugova's money man (and Prime Minister in exile).
The KLA was able to expand its presence in Albania, mainly in its
training and operations centres near Kukes, Ljabinot (near Tirana)
and Bajram Curi. Albania had a growing say in the affairs of the KLA as it recomposed itself - it was instrumental in summoning the KLA to Rambouillet, for instance. This armed revelry coupled with the rising fortunes of separatism, led Robert Gelbard, the senior US envoy to the Balkan to label the KLA - "a terrorist organization". The Serbs took this to mean a licence to kill, which they exercised dutifully in Drenica. Promptly, the USA changed course and the indomitable Madeleine Albright switched parties, saying: "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia". This stern consistency was followed by a tightening of the embargo against Yugoslavia and by a threat of unilateral action. For the first time in history, the Kosovars finally had a sponsor - and what a sponsor! The mightiest of all. As for Milosevic, he felt nauseatingly betrayed. Not only was he not rewarded for his role as the Dayton peacemaker - he was faced with new sanctions, an ultimatum and a direct threat on the very perpetuation of his regime. The KLA mushroomed
not because it attacked Serbs (very sporadically and to a minuscule
effect). It ballooned because it delivered where Rugova didn't even
promise. It delivered an alliance with the USA against the hated Serbs.
It delivered weapons. It delivered hope and a plan. It delivered vengeance,
the self-expression of the downtrodden. It was joined by near and
far and, by its own reckoning, its ranks swelled to 50,000 warriors.
More objective experts put the figure of active fighters at one fourth
this number. Still, it is an impressive number in a population of
1.7 million Albanians. During the war, it was joined by 400 overweight suburbanites from North America, Albanian volunteers within an "Atlantic Brigade". It also absorbed Albanians with rich military experience from Serbia and Croatia as well as foreign mercenaries and possibly "Afghanis" (the devout Moslem veterans of the wars in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Bosnia). The influx of
volunteers put pressure on the leadership - both organizational and
pecuniary. The KLA - an entrepreneurial start up of insurgency - had
matured into a national brand of guerilla. It revamped itself, creating
directorates, offices and officers, codes and procedures, a radio
station and a news agency, an electronic communications interception
unit, a word of mouth messenger service and a general military staff,
headed since February 1999 by "Sultan" and divided to seven
operational zones. In short, it reacted to changing fortunes by creating
a bureaucracy. Concurrently, it armed itself to its teeth with more
sophisticated weapons than ever before (though it was still short
of medical supplies, ammunition and communications equipment). The
KLA now had shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers (like
the German "Armburst"), mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-aircraft
machine-guns and automatic assault rifles. Some of the weapons were
even bought from Serb army officers or imported through Hungary. All
this required a financial phase transition. That the KLA has benefited,
directly and knowingly, from money tainted by drug trafficking and
smuggling of both goods and people across borders - can be in little
doubt. But I find the proposition that the KLA itself has traded in
drugs unlikely. The long-established Albanian clans which control the "Balkan Route" - the same clans that faced down the fearsome Turkish gangs on their own turf - would have never let an upstart such as the KLA take over any of their territory and its incumbent profits. The KLA might have traded weapons. It might have dabbled in smuggling. It might have received donations from drug lords. In this, it is no different from all major modern guerilla movements. But it did not peddle drugs - not because of moral scruples but because of the lethal competition it would have encountered. That the KLA had to resort to such condemnable methods of financing is not surprising. Rugova refused to share with it the funds abroad managed by Bujar Bukoshi on behalf of the "Kosovar People". It had no other means of income and, as opposed to Rugova, it could act only clandestinely and surreptitiously. The West was no great help either - contrary to the myth spun by the Serbs. Another source of income was the 3% "War Tax" levied on 500,000 Kosovar Albanians and their businesses in the diaspora (though most of it ended up under Bukoshi's and Rugova's control). Officially collected by the People's Movement of Kosovo, the ultimate use of the proceeds was the sustenance of the shadow republic. The KLA made use of the voluntary and not so voluntary donations to the Swiss-based fund "Homeland Calls" (or "Motherland is Calling"). The USA - the
pragmatic superpower that it is - began to divert its attention from
the bumbling and hapless Rugova to the emerging KLA. The likes of Gelbard and, his senior, Richard Holbrooke, held talks with its youthful political director, Hashim Thaci - suave, togged up and earnest, he was just what the doctor ordered. To discern that a showdown in Kosovo was near required no prophetic powers. The KLA might come handy to espy the land and to divert the Serb forces should the need arise. "The Clinton administration has diligently put everything in place for intervention. In fact, by mid-July US-NATO planners had completed contingency plans for intervention, including air strikes and the deployment of ground troops. All that was missing was a sufficiently brutal or tragic event to trigger the process. As a senior Defence Department official told reporters on July 15, 'If some levels of atrocities were reached that would be intolerable, that would probably be a trigger.'" - wrote Gary Dempsey from the Cato Institute in October 1998. The author of this article published another one in the "Middle East Times" in August 1998 in which the Kosovo conflict was delineated in reasonably accurate detail ("The Plight of the Kosovar"). The article was written in April 1998 - by which time the outline of things to come was plain. All along, the
KLA prepared itself to be a provisional government in-waiting. It
occupied regions of Kosovo, established roadblocks, administration,
welfare offices. Its members operated nocturnally. The Serb reaction
got ever harsher until finally it threatened not only to wipe the
KLA out of existence but also to depopulate the parts of the province
controlled by it. In September 1998, NATO threatened air strikes against
Serbia, following reports of a massacre of women and children in the
village of Gornje Obrinje. This led to the October 20th agreement with Belgrade, which postulated a reduction in the levels of Yugoslav troops in the province. The KLA was all but ignored in these events. Rugova was not. He was often consulted by the American negotiators and treated like a head of state. The message was deafeningly clear: the KLA was a pawn on the chessboard of war. It had no place where the civilized and the responsible tread. It had no raison d'etre in peacetime. It reacted by hitting a number of "Serb collaborators" (mostly of Gorani extract - Muslim Slavs who speak a dialect of Albanian). One of the disposed was Enver Maloku, Rugova's close associate. On January 15, 1999, in the village of Racak, someone murdered scores of people and dumped them by the roadside. The KLA blamed the Serbs. The Serbs blamed the KLA and William Walker, the head of the OSCE observer team. The media reports were inconclusive. While everyone was fighting over the smouldering bodies, NATO was preparing to attack and Walker withdrew his observer team from Kosovo into an increasingly reluctant and enraged Macedonia. Faced with sovereignty-infringing and regime-destabilizing demands at Rambouillet, the Serbs declined. Under pressure and after days of consultations, the Albanian delegation accepted the dictated draft agreement hesitatingly. In the absence of the predicted Serb capitulation, "Operation Allied Forces" commenced. Rambouillet was
a turning point for the KLA. Evidently on the verge of war, the USA
reverted to its preferences of yore. The KLA, a more useful ally on the ground in battle, took over from the LDK as the US favourite. At the behest of the United States, KLA representatives not only were present, but headed the Kosovar negotiating team. Thaci took some convincing and shuttling between Rambouillet, Switzerland and Kosovo - but finally, in March, he accepted the terms of the agreement with a sombre Rugova in tow. These public acts of statesmanship: negotiating, bargaining and, finally, accepting graciously - cemented the role and image of the KLA as not only a military outfit but also a political organization with the talent and wherewithal to lead the Kosovars. Rugova's position was never more negligible and marginal. AFTER "The KLA will transform in many directions, not just a military guard. One part will become part of the police, one part will become civil administration, one part will become the Army of Kosovo, as a defence force. Finally, a part will form a political party."Agim Ceku, KLA CDR The Western media
hit a nadir of bias and unprofessional sycophancy during the Kosovo
crisis. It, therefore, remains unclear who pulled whose strings. The
KLA was seen to be more adept at spin doctoring than hubris-infested
NATO. It started the war as an outcast and ended it as an ally of
NATO on the ground and the real government of a future Kosovo. It
capitalized ingeniously on Rugova's mysterious disappearance and then
on his, even less comprehensible, refusal to visit the refugee camps
and to return to liberated Kosovo. It interfaced marvellously with both youthful prime ministers - Albania's Pandeli Majko and Macedonia's Ljubco Georgievski. This new-found camaraderie ended in a summit with the latter, organized by Arben Xhaferi (Dzaferi), an influential Albanian coalition partner in Macedonia (and, many say, Thaci's business partner in Kosovo). Georgievski, who did more for Macedonia's regional integration and amicable relationships with its neighbours than all the previous governments of Macedonia combined - did not hesitate to shake the hand of the political leader of an organization still decried by his own Interior Ministry as "terrorist". It was a gamble - bold and, in hindsight, farsighted - but still, a gamble. Rugova himself was not accorded such an honour when he finally passed through Macedonia, on his way to his demolished homeland. During the war, the KLA absorbed new recruits from Macedonia (many Macedonian Albanians died in battle in the fields of Kosovo), from Germany, Switzerland, the USA, Australia and some Moslem countries. In other words, it was internationalized. It was equipped (though only niggardly) by the West. And it coped with the double task of diplomacy (Thaci's famous televised discussions with Madeleine Albright, for instance) and political organization. It was engaged in field guerilla warfare and reconnaissance without the proper training for either. Add to this tactical military co-ordination and the need to integrate a second, Rugova and Berisha sponsored Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) and the KLA seems to have been taxed to its breaking point. Cracks began to appear and it was downhill ever since. Never before was such an enormous political capital wasted so thoroughly in so short a time by so few. One must not forget that victory was not assured until the last moment. The West's reluctance to commit ground troops to the escalating conflict - as mass expulsions cum sporadic massacres of the indigenous population by the Serbs were taking place - was considered by many KLA fighters to have been a violation of a "Besa" (the sacred Albanian vow) given to them by NATO. Opinions regarding the grand strategy of conducting the war differed strongly. The agreement with Milosevic that ended the war did not mention any transition period at the end of which the Kosovars will decide their fate in a referendum. It felt like betrayal. At the beginning, there was strong, grassroots resistance to disarmament. Many Kosovars felt that the advantage obtained should be pressed to the point of independence or at least, a transition period. Then, when the dust settled, the spoils of war served to widen the rifts. Internecine fighting erupted and is still afoot. The occasional murder served to delineate the territories of each commander and faction within the strained KLA. Everything was and is subject to fluid arrangements of power and profit sharing - from soft drink licences, through cigarette smuggling and weapons dealing and down to the allocation of funds (some of them still of dubious sources). The situation was further compounded by the invasion of criminal elements from Albania proper. The Kosovar crime clans were effected by the war (though their activities never really ceased) and into the vacuum gushed Albanian organized and ruthless crime. But contrary to media-fostered popular images - crime was but one thread in the emerging tapestry of the new Kosovo. Other, no less critical issues were and are demilitarization and self-government. Albanians and Serbs have more in common than they care to admit. Scattered among various political entities, both nations came up with a grandiose game plan - Milosevic's "Great Serbia" and the KLA's "Great Albania". The idea, in both cases, was to create an ethnically homogeneous state by shifting existing borders, incorporating hitherto excluded parts of the nation and excluding hitherto included minorities. Whereas Milosevic had at his disposal the might of the Yugoslav army (or, so he thought) - the Albanians had only impoverished and decomposing Albania to back them. Still, the emotional bond that formed, fostered by a common vision and shared hope - is intact. Albanian flags fly over Albanian municipalities in Kosovo and in Macedonia. The possession
of weapons and self-government have always been emblematic of the
anticipated statehood of Kosovo. Being disarmed and deprived of self-governance
was, to the Albanians, a humiliating and enraging experience, evocative
of earlier, Serb-inflicted, injuries. Moreover, it was indicative
of the perplexed muddle the West is mired in - officially, Kosovo
is part of Yugoslavia. But it is also occupied by foreign forces and
has its own customs, currency, bank licensing, entry visas and other
insignia of sovereignty (shortly, even an internet domain, KO). This quandary is a typically anodyne European compromise which is bound to ferment into atrabilious discourse and worse. The Kosovars - understandably - will never accept Serb sovereignty or even Serb propinquity willingly. Ignoring the inevitable, tergiversating and equivocating have too often characterized the policies of the Big Powers - the kind of behaviour that turned the Balkan into the morass that it is today. It is, therefore,
inconceivable that the KLA has disbanded and disarmed or transformed
itself into the ill-conceived and ill-defined "Kosovo Protection
Corps" (headed by former KLA commander and decorated Croat Lieutenant
General, Agim Ceku and charged with fire fighting, rescue missions
and the like). Thousands of KLA members found jobs (or scholarships,
or seed money) through the International Organization for Migration
(IOM). But, in all likelihood, the KLA still maintains clandestine
arms depots (intermittently raided by KFOR), strewn throughout Kosovo
and beyond. Its chain of command, organizational structure, directorates,
operational and assembly zones and general staff are all viable. I
have no doubt - though little proof - that it still trains and prepares
for war. It would be mad not to in this state of utter mayhem. The
emergence of the "Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac"
(all towns beyond Kosovo's borders, in Serbia, but with an Albanian
majority) is a harbinger. Its soldiers even wear badges in the red, black and yellow KLA colours. The enemies are numerous: the Serbs (should Kosovo ever be returned to them), NATO and KFOR (should they be charged with the task of reintegrating Serbia), perhaps more moderate Albanians with lesser national zeal or Serb-collaborators (like Zemail Mustafi, the Albanian vice president of the Bujanovac branch of President Slobodan Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party, who was assassinated three months ago). Moreover, the very borders of Kosovo are in dispute. The territory known to its inhabitants as "Eastern Kosovo" now comprises 70,000 Albanians, captives in a hostile Serbia. Yet, "Eastern Kosovo" was never part of the administrative province of Kosovo. The war is far from over. In the meantime,
life is gradually returning to normal in Kosovo itself. Former KLA
fighters engage in all manner of odd jobs - from shovelling snow in
winter to burning bushes in summer. Even the impossible Joint Administrative
Council (Serbs, Albanians and peacekeepers) with its 19 departments,
convenes from time to time. The periodic resignation of the overweening
Bernard Kouchner aside, things are going well. A bank has been established,
another one is on its way. Electricity is being gradually restored
and so are medical services and internet connections. Downtown Pristina
is reconstructed by Albanians from Switzerland. Such normalization
can prove lethal to an organization like the KLA, founded on strife
and crisis as it is. If it does not transform itself into a political
organization in a convincing manner - it might lose its members to
the more alluring pastures of statecraft. The local and general elections
so laboriously (and expensively) organized in Kosovo are the KLA's
first real chance at transformation. It failed at its initial effort
to establish a government (together with Qosaj's Democratic Union
Movement, an umbrella organization of parties in opposition to Rugova
and with Hashim Thaci as its Prime Minister). Overruled by UNMIK (United
Nations Mission In Kosovo), opposed by Berisha's Democratic Party,
recognized only by Albania and the main Albanian party in Macedonia
and bereft of finances, it was unable to imbue structure with content
and provide the public goods a government is all about. The KLA was
so starved for cash that it was unable even to pay the salaries of
its own personnel. Many criminals caught in the act claimed to be
KLA members in dire financial straits. Ineptitude and insolvency led
to a dramatic resurgence in the popularity of the hitherto discarded
Rugova. The KLA then failed to infiltrate existing structures of governance
erected by the West (like the Executive Council) - or to duplicate
them. Thaci's quest to become deputy-Kouchner was brusquely rebuffed.
The ballot box seems now to be the KLA's only exit strategy. The risk
is that electoral loss will lead to alienation and thuggery if not
to outright criminality. It is a fine balancing act between the virtuous
ideals of democracy and the harsh constraints of realpolitik. At this stage and with elections looming, Hashim Thaci sounds conciliatory tones. He is talking about a common (Albanian and Serb) resolution of the division of Mitrovica and the problem of missing persons. But even he knows that multi-ethnicity is dead and that the best that can be hoped for is tolerant co-existence. His words are, therefore, intended to curry favour with the West out of the misguided and naive belief that the key to Kosovo's future lies there rather than in the will of the Kosovar people. Western aid is habit forming and creates dependence and the KLA consumed a lot of it. Politically, the KLA has not yet pupated. Recently, it has embarked on a spate of coalition-forming, initially with Bardhyl Mahmuti of the Democratic Progressive Party of Kosovo (PPDK) - the former KLA representative in Western Europe. It seeks to marry its dwindling funds and seat at the West's banquet with the reputation and clout of the PPDK's local dignitaries. This coveted and negotiable access to Western structures of government bears some elaboration. Kosovar parties and individuals present at the Rambouillet talks were entitled, according to the Rambouillet Agreement and UN General Resolution 1244, to serve, together with UNMIK delegates, on a Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). Thus, when KTC was formed in the wake of Operation Allied Force, it was made of Rugova's LDK, Thaci's KLA, and Rexhep Qosaj's (Qosje) Democratic Union League. There was a token Serb and two independents - the aforementioned Veton Surroi and Blerim Shala, editor-in-chief of the Pristina weekly Zeri. Many newly-formed political parties, such as Mahmuti's were left out of the KTC and the Executive Council (which is made of one representative of each of the four largest Kosovar political parties plus four representatives from UNMIK). This - a seat at the cherished table - seems to be the only tangible asset of the KLA. But it came at a dear price. The Executive Council virtually paralysed Thaci's self-proclaimed and self-appointed government, absorbing many of its ministers and officials with lucrative offers of salaries and budgets. Thaci himself had to give up a part of the plethora of his self-bestowed titles. This move again proves Thaci's simplistic perception that to win elections in Kosovo one needs to be seen to be a friend of the West. I have no doubt that this photo-opportunity brand of politics will backfire. The KLA's popularity among the potential electorate is at a nadir and it is being accused of venality, incompetence and outright crime. A lasting transformation of such an image cannot be attained by terpsichorean supineness. To regain its position, the KLA must regenerate itself and revert to its grassroots. It must dedicate equal time to diplomacy and to politics. It must identify its true constituency - and it is by no means UNMIK. Above all, it must hone its skills of collaboration and compromise. Politics - as opposed to warfare - are never a zero sum game. The operative principle is "live and let live" rather than "shoot first or die". A mental transformation is required, an adjustment of codes of conduct and principles of thought. Should the KLA find in itself the flexibility and intellectual resources - rare commodities in ideological movements - needed to achieve this transition, it might still compose the first government of an independent Kosovo. If it were to remain intransigent and peevish - it is likely to end up being barely a bloody footnote in history. Return Narcissists, Group Behaviour, and Terrorism Interview with Sam Vaknin | Published in "The Idler" Sam Vaknin is
the author of 'Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited', owner
of the Narcissistic Abuse Study List, and webmaster of the Narcissistic
Personality Disorder Topic in Suite101. He is also an economic and
political analyst for United Press International (UPI). All
of us have narcissistic TRAITS. Some of us even develop
a narcissistic PERSONALITY. Moreover, narcissism
is a SPECTRUM of behaviours - from the healthy to
the utterly pathological (known as the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, or NPD). The DSM IV uses this language: "An all-pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behaviour), need for admiration or adulation and lack of empathy, usually beginning by early adulthood and present in various contexts." Here are the 9 criteria. Having 5 of these 9 "qualifies" you as a narcissist...
The language in the criteria above is based on or summarized from: American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, fourth edition (DSM IV). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Sam Vaknin. (1999, 2001). Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited, second, revised printing Prague and Skopje: Narcissus Publications. ("Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited" http://samvak.tripod.com/faq1.html) More Data About Pathological Narcissists o Most narcissists (75%) are men. o NPD (=the Narcissistic Personality Disorder) is one of a "family" of personality disorders (formerly known as "Cluster B"). Other members: Borderline PD, Antisocial PD and Histrionic PD. o NPD is often diagnosed with other mental health disorders ("co-morbidity") - or with substance abuse, or impulsive and reckless behaviours ("dual diagnosis"). o NPD is new (1980) mental health category in the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (DSM). o There is only scant research regarding narcissism. But what there is has not demonstrated any ethnic, social, cultural, economic, genetic, or professional predilection to NPD. o It is estimated that 0.7-1% of the general population suffer from NPD. o Pathological narcissism was first described in detail by Freud. Other major contributors are: Klein, Horney, Kohut, Kernberg, Millon, Roningstam, Gunderson, Hare. o The onset of narcissism is in infancy, childhood and early adolescence. It is commonly attributed to childhood abuse and trauma inflicted by parents, authority figures, or even peers. o There is a whole range of narcissistic reactions - from the mild, reactive and transient to the permanent personality disorder. o Narcissists are either "Cerebral" (derive their narcissistic supply from their intelligence or academic achievements) - or "Somatic" (derive their narcissistic supply from their physique, exercise, physical or sexual prowess and "conquests"). o Narcissists are either "Classic" - see definition below - or they are "Compensatory", or "Inverted" - see definitions here: "The Inverted Narcissist". o NPD is treated in talk therapy (psychodynamic or cognitive-behavioural). The prognosis for an adult narcissist is poor, though his adaptation to life and to others can improve with treatment. Medication is applied to side-effects and behaviours (such as mood or affect disorders and obsession-compulsion) - usually with some success. 2. Human collectives (nations, professions, ethnic groups) and narcissism - stereotyping or racism? Having lived in 12 countries in 3 continents now, I firmly believe in "mass psychopathology", or in ethnopsychology. The members of a group - if sufficiently cohesive - tend to react similarly to circumstances. By "cohesive" I mean, if they share the same mental world ("Weltanschauung") - possibly the same history, the same language or dialect, the same hopes, folklore, fears, and aspirations ("agenda"), the same enemies and so on. Thus, if recurrently
traumatized or abused by external or internal forces, a group of people
may develop the mass equivalent of pathological narcissism as a defence
or compensatory mechanism. By "abuse" and "trauma" I
mean any event, or series of events, or circumstances, which threaten
the self identity, self image, sense of self worth, and self esteem
of the collective consistently and constantly - though often arbitrarily
and unpredictably. Human collectives go through formation, individuation,
separation - all the phases in individual psychological development.
A disturbance in the natural and unhindered progression of these phases
is likely to result in psychopathology of all the members of the collective.
Being subjugated to another nation, being exiled, enduring genocide,
being destitute, being defeated in warfare - are all traumatic experiences
with far reaching consequences. The members of
the collective form a "condensate" (in physical terms) -
a material in which all the atoms vibrate with the same frequency.
Under normal circumstances, group behaviour resembles diffuse light.
Subject to trauma and abuse - it forms a malignant laser - a strong,
same wavelength, potentially destructive beam. The group becomes abusive
to others, exploitative, detached from reality, bathed in grandiose
fantasies, xenophobic, lacking empathy, prone to uncontrolled rages,
over-sensitive, convinced of its superiority and entitlement. Force
and coercion are often required to disabuse such a group of its
delusions. But, this of course, only cements its narcissism and justifies
its distorted perception of the world. The Jews have been subjected to the kind of trauma and abuse I mentioned earlier on an unprecedented and never repeated scale. Their formal scriptures, lore, and ethos are imbued with grandiose fantasies and a towering sense of superiority and "mission". Yet, the inevitable contempt for their inferiors is tampered by the all-pervasive pragmatism the Jews had to develop in order to survive. Narcissists are not pragmatic. They live in a Universe of their own making. They see no need to get along with others. Jews are not like that. Their creed is a practical survival guide which obliges them to accommodate others, to empathize with their needs and desires, to compromise, to admit errors, to share credit, to collaborate, and so on. Israelis, on the
other hand, are "unshackled" Jews. They believe themselves
to be the mirror image of the diaspora Jew. They are physical
("somatic"), strong, productive, independent, in control.
They, in short, are less bound by the need to perilously co-exist
with baleful, predatory, majorities. They can allow themselves a full,
unmitigated, expression of whatever defence mechanisms they evolved
in response to millennia of virulent hatred and murderous persecutions.
Being an Israeli, I gained privileged insight into this fascinating
transformation from tortured slave to vengeful master. Are all politicians
narcissists? The answer, surprisingly, is: not universally. The preponderance
of narcissistic traits and personalities in politics is much less
than in show business, for instance. Moreover, while show business
is concerned essentially (and almost exclusively) with the securing
of narcissistic supply - politics is a much more complex and multi-faceted
activity. Rather, it is a spectrum. At the one end, we find the "actors"
- politicians who regard politics as their venue and their conduit,
an extended theatre with their constituency as an audience. At the
other extreme, we find self-effacing and schizoid (crowd-hating) technocrats.
Most politicians are in the middle: somewhat self-enamoured, opportunistic
and seeking modest doses of narcissistic supply - but mostly concerned
with perks, self-preservation and the exercise of power. Pathological narcissism is the result of individual upbringing (see: "The Narcissist's Mother" and "Narcissists and Schizoids" ) and, in this sense, it is universal and cuts across time and space. Yet, the very process of socialization and education is heavily constrained by the prevailing culture and influenced by it. Thus, culture, mores, history, myths, ethos, and even government policy (such as the "one child policy" in China) do create the conditions for pathologies of the personality. The ethnopsychologist George Devereux ("Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry", University of Chicago Press, 1980) suggested to divide the unconscious into the id (the part that was always instinctual and unconscious) and the "ethnic unconscious" (repressed material that was once conscious). The latter includes all our defence mechanisms and most of the superego. Culture dictates what is to be repressed. Mental illness is either idiosyncratic (cultural directives are not followed and the individual is unique and schizophrenic) - or conformist, abiding by the cultural dictates of what is allowed and disallowed. Our culture, according to Christopher Lasch teaches us to withdraw into ourselves when we are confronted with stressful situations. It is a vicious circle. One of the main stressors of modern society is alienation and a pervasive sense of isolation. The solution our culture offers us - to further withdraw - only exacerbates the problem. Richard Sennett expounded on this theme in "The Fall of Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism" (Vintage Books, 1978). One of the chapters in Devereux's aforementioned tome is entitled "Schizophrenia: An Ethnic Psychosis, or Schizophrenia without Tears". To him, the whole USA is afflicted by what came later to be called a "schizoid disorder". C. Fred Alford (in "Narcissism: Socrates, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalytic Theory", Yale University Press, 1988) enumerates the symptoms: "...withdrawal, emotional aloofness, hyporeactivity (emotional flatness), sex without emotional involvement, segmentation and partial involvement (lack of interest and commitment to things outside oneself), fixation on oral- stage issues, regression, infantilism and depersonalization. These, of course, are many of the same designations that Lasch employs to describe the culture of narcissism. Thus, it appears, that it is not misleading to equate narcissism with schizoid disorder." (page 19). Consider the Balkan region, for instance: http://samvak.tripod.com/pp25.html
| http://samvak.tripod.com/pp29.html 5. Christopher Lasch, American "culture of narcissism" and the long term effects of the September 11 atrocities Lasch and his work are increasingly relevant in post September America. This is partly because the likes of bin Laden hurl at America primitive and coarse versions of Lasch's critique. They accuse America of being a failed civilization, not merely of meddling ignorantly and sacriligeously in the affairs of Islam (and the rest of the world). They fervently believe that America exports this contagious failure to other cultures and societies (through its idolatrous mass media and inferior culture industries) and thus "infects" them with the virus of its own terminal decline. It is important to understand the left wing roots of this cancerous rendition of social criticism. Lasch wrote: "The new
narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to
inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life.
Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality
of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds
little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same
time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone
as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy. Hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development and distrusts even their limited expression in sports and games. He extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive individualist of nineteenth-century political economy, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire."(Christopher Lasch - The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an age of Diminishing Expectations, 1979) There is no single
Lasch. This chronicler of culture, did so mainly by chronicling his
inner turmoil, conflicting ideas and ideologies, emotional upheavals,
and intellectual vicissitudes. In this sense, of (courageous) self-documentation,
Mr. Lasch epitomized Narcissism, was the quintessential Narcissist,
the better positioned to criticize the phenomenon. "Narcissism" is a relatively well-defined psychological term. I expound upon it elsewhere ("Malignant self Love - Narcissism Re-Visited"). The Narcissistic Personality Disorder - the acute form of pathological Narcissism - is the name given to a group of 9 symptoms (see: DSM-4). They include: a grandiose Self (illusions of grandeur coupled with an inflated, unrealistic sense of the Self), inability to empathize with the Other, the tendency to exploit and manipulate others, idealization of other people (in cycles of idealization and devaluation), rage attacks and so on. Narcissism, therefore, has a clear clinical definition, etiology and prognosis. The use that Lasch makes of this word has nothing to do with its usage in psychopathology. True, Lasch did his best to sound "medicinal". He spoke of "(national) malaise" and accused the American society of lack of self-awareness. But choice of words does not a coherence make. "The Culture of Narcissism - American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations" was published in the last year of the unhappy presidency of Jimmy Carter (1979). The latter endorsed the book publicly (in his famous "national malaise" speech). The main thesis of the book is that the Americans have created a self-absorbed (though not self aware), greedy and frivolous society which depended on consumerism, demographic studies, opinion polls and Government to know and to define itself. What is the solution? Lasch proposed a "return to basics": self-reliance, the family, nature, the community, and the Protestant work ethic. To those who adhere, he promised an elimination of their feelings of alienation and despair. But the clinical term "Narcissism" was abused by Lasch in his books. It joined other words mistreated by this social preacher. The respect that this man gained in his lifetime (as a social scientist and historian of culture) makes one wonder whether he was right in criticizing the shallowness and lack of intellectual rigor of American society and of its elites. There is a detailed analysis here, in a reaction I wrote to Roger Kimball's "Christopher Lasch vs. the elites""New Criterion", Vol. 13, p.9 (04-01-1995):
Terrorists can be phenomenologically described as narcissists in a constant state of deficient narcissistic supply. The "grandiosity gap" - the painful and narcissistically injurious gap between their grandiose fantasies and their dreary and humiliating reality - becomes emotionally insupportable. They decompensate and act out. They bring "down to their level" (by destroying it) the object of their pathological envy, the cause of their seething frustration, the symbol of their dull achievements, always incommensurate with their inflated self-image. They seek omnipotence through murder, control (not least self control) through violence, prestige, fame and celebrity by defying figures of authorities, challenging them, and humbling them. Unbeknownst to them, they seek self punishment. They are at heart suicidal. They aim to cast themselves as victims by forcing others to punish them. This is called "projective identification". They attribute evil and corruption to their enemies and foes. These forms of paranoia are called projection and splitting. These are all primitive, infantile, and often persecutory, defense mechanisms. When coupled with
narcissism - the inability to empathize, the exploitativeness, the
sense of entitlement, the rages, the dehumanization and devaluation
of others - this mindset yields abysmal contempt. The overriding
emotion of terrorists and serial killers, the amalgam and culmination of
their tortured psyche - is deep seated disdain for everything human,
the flip side of envy. It is cognitive dissonance gone amok. On the
one hand the terrorist derides as "false", "meaningless",
"dangerous", and "corrupt" common values, institutions,
human intercourse, and society. On the other hand, he devotes
his entire life (and often risks it) to the elimination and pulverization
of these "insignificant" entities. To justify this apparent
contradiction, the terrorists casts himself as an altruistic saviour
of a group of people "endangered" by his foes. He is always
self-appointed and self-proclaimed, rarely elected. The serial killer
rationalizes and intellectualizes his murders similarly, by purporting
to "liberate" or "deliver" his victims from a
fate worse than death. The global reach, the secrecy, the impotence and growing panic of his victims, of the public, and of his pursuers, the damage he wreaks - all serve as external ego functions. The terrorist and serial killer regulate their sense of self esteem and self worth by feeding slavishly on the reactions to their heinous deeds. Their cosmic significance is daily enhanced by newspaper headlines, ever increasing bounties, admiring imitators, successful acts of blackmail, the strength and size of their opponents, and the devastation of human life and property. Appeasement works only to aggravate their drives and strengthen their appetites by emboldening them and by raising the threshold of excitation and "narcissistic supply". Terrorists and killers are addicted to this drug of being acknowledged and reflected. They derive their sense of existence, parasitically, from the reactions of their (often captive) audience. APPENDIX - Responses in a correspondence following the publication of this interview Zionism
has always regarded itself as both a (19th century) national
movement AND a (colonial) civilizing force: See
- Herzl's Butlers – The Holocaust was a massive trauma NOT because of its dimensions - but because GERMANS, the epitome of Western civilization, have turned on the Jews, the self-proclaimed missionaries of Western civilization in the Levant and Arabia. It was the betrayal that mattered. Rejected by East (as colonial stooges) and West (as agents of racial contamination) alike - the Jews resorted to a series of narcissistic defences reified by the State of Israel. The long term occupation of territories (metaphorical or physical) is a classic narcissistic trait (of "annexation" of the other). The Six Days War was a war of self defence - but the swift victory only exacerbated the narcissistic defences. Mastery over the Palestinians became an important component in the psychological makeup of the nation (especially the more rightwing and religious elements) because it constitutes "Narcissistic Supply". Bin
Laden (and by extension Islamic fundamentalism) is the narcissistic
complement of the State of Israel. His narcissistic
defences are fuelled by unrequited humiliation (Millon's "compensatory
narcissism"). The humiliation is the outcome of a grandiosity
gap between reality and grandiose fantasies, between actual inferiority
and a delusional sense of superiority (and cosmic mission), between
his sense of entitlement and his incommensurate achievements, skills,
and accomplishments. When
narcissists are faced with the disintegration of their narcissistic
"infrastructure" (their False Self) – theydecompensate.
I have outlined the possible psychodynamic reactions here: http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/npd/87772
What
GIVES RISE to the grandiosity gap IS socio- economic reality. The
gap is between the REAL and the IDEAL, between the ACTUAL and the
(self- DELUSIONAL and FANTASIZED. Socio-economic factors breed narcissistic
injury and narcissistic rage. Introduction "There are two maxims for historians which so harmonise with what I know of history that I would like to claim them as my own, though they really belong to nineteenth-century historiography: first, that governments try to press upon the historian the key to all the drawers but one, and are anxious to spread the belief that this single one contains no secret of importance; secondly, that if the historian can only find the thing which the government does not want him to know, he will lay his hand upon something that is likely to be significant." Herbert Butterfield, "History and Human Relations", London, 1951, p. 186
This sempiternal fight is a determinant of Balkan identity. The nations of the Balkan are defined more by ornery opposition than by cohesive identities. They derive sustenance and political-historical coherence from conflict. It is their afflatus. The more complex the axes of self-definition, the more multifaceted and intractable the conflicts. Rabid nationalism against utopian regionalism, fascism (really, opportunism) versus liberalism, religion-tinted traditionalism (the local moribund edition of conservatism) versus "Western" modernity. Who wins is of crucial importance to world peace. The Balkan is a relatively new political entity. Formerly divided between the decrepit Ottoman Empire and the imploding Austro-Hungarian one - the countries of the Balkans emerged as unique polities only during the 19th century. This was to be expected as a wave of nationalism swept Europe and led to the formation of the modern, bureaucratic state as we know it. Even so, the discrete
entities that struggled to the surface of statehood did not feel that
they shared a regional destiny or identity. All they did was fight
ferociously, ruthlessly and mercilessly over the corrupted remnants
of the Sick Men of Europe (the above mentioned two residual empires).
In this, they proved themselves to be the proper heirs of their former
masters: murderous, suborned, Byzantine and nearsighted. In an effort to justify their misdeeds and deeds, the various nations - true and concocted - conjured up histories, languages, cultures and documents, some real, mostly false. They staked claims to the same territories, donned common heritage where there was none, spoke languages artificially constructed and lauded a culture hastily assembled by "historians" and "philologists". These were the roots of the great evil - the overlapping claims, the resulting intolerance, the mortal, existential fear stoked by the kaleidoscopic conduct of the Big Powers. To recognize the existence of the Macedonian identity - was to threaten the Greek or Bulgarian ones. To accept the antiquity of the Albanians was to dismantle Macedonia, Serbia and Greece. To countenance Bulgarian demands was to inhumanly penalize its Turk citizens. It was a zero-sum game played viciously by everyone involved. The prize was mere existence - the losers annihilated. It very nearly came to that during the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Allies shifted their allegiance in accordance with the shifting fortunes of a most bewildering battlefield. When the dust settled, two treaties later, Macedonia was dismembered by its neighbours, Bulgaria bitterly contemplated the sour fruits of its delusional aggression and Serbia and Austro-Hungary rejoiced. Thus were the seeds of World War I sown. The Yugoslav war of succession (or civil war) was a continuation of this mayhem by other means. Yugoslavia was born in sin, in the dictatorship of King Alexander I (later slain in France in 1934). It faced agitation, separatism and discontent from its inception. It was falling apart when the second world conflagration erupted. It took a second dictatorship - Tito's - to hold it together for another 40 years. The Balkan as a whole - from Hungary, through Romania and down to Bulgaria - was prone to authoritarianism and an atavistic, bloody form of racist, "peasant or native fascism". A primitive region of destitute farmers and vile politicians, it was exposed to world gaze by the collapse of communism. There are encouraging signs of awakening, of change and adaptation. There are dark omens of reactionary forces, of violence and wrath. It is a battle fought in the unconscious of humanity itself. It is a tug of war between memories and primordial drives repressed and the vitality of those still close to nature. The outcome of
this fight is crucial to the world. Both world wars started in central
eastern and south-eastern Europe. Globalization is no guarantee against
a third one. The world was more globalized than it is today at the
beginning of the century - but it took only one shot in Sarajevo to
make this the most sanguineous century of all. An added problem is the simple-mindedness, abrasiveness and sheer historical ignorance of America, the current superpower. A nation of soundbites and black or white stereotypes, it is ill-suited to deal with the nuanced, multilayered and interactive mayhem that is the Balkan. A mentality of western movies - good guys, bad guys, shoot'em up - is hardly conducive to a Balkan resolution. The intricate and drawn out process required taxes American impatience and bullying tendencies to their explosive limits. In the camp of the good guys, the Anglo-Saxons place Romania, Greece, Montenegro and Slovenia (with Macedonia, Croatia, Albania and Bulgaria wandering in and out). Serbia is the epitome of evil. Milosevic is Hitler. Such uni-dimensional thinking sends a frisson of rubicund belligerence down American spines. It tends to ignore
reality, though. Montenegro is playing the liberal card deftly, no
doubt - but it is also a haven of smuggling and worse. Slovenia is
the civilized facade that it so tediously presents to the world -
but it also happened to have harboured one of the vilest fascist movements,
comparable to the Ustasha - the Domobranci. It shares with Croatia
the narcissistic grandiose fantasy that it is not a part of the Balkan
- but rather an outpost of Europe - and the disdain for its impoverished
neighbours that comes with it. In this sense, it is more "Balkanian" than many of them. Greece is now an economically stable and mildly democratic country - but it used to be a dictatorship and it still is a banana republic in more than one respect. The Albanians - ferociously suppressed by the Serbs and (justly) succoured by the West - are industrious and shrewd people. But - fervent protestations to the contrary aside - they do seem to be intent on dismantling and recombining both Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Macedonia, perhaps at a terrible cost to all involved. Together with the Turks, the Serbs and the Bulgarians, the Albanians are the undisputed crime lords of the Balkan (and beyond - witness their incarceration rates in Switzerland). This is the Balkan - a florilegium of contradictions within contraventions, the mawkish and the jaded, the charitable and the deleterious, the feckless and the bumptious, evanescent and exotic, a mystery wrapped in an enigma. In this article,
I will attempt to study two axes of friction: Islam versus Christianity
and fascism and nationalism versus liberalism. It is hard to do justice
to these topics in the Procrustean bed of weekly columns - I, therefore,
beg the forgiveness of scholars and the understanding of frustrated
readers. A First Encounter "In accordance with this [right to act], whenever some one of the infidel parents or some other should oppose the giving up of his son for the Janiccaries, he is immediately hanged from his doorsill, his blood being deemed unworthy." Turkish firman, 1601 "...The Turks have built several fortresses in my kingdom and are very kind to the country folk. They promise freedom to every peasant who converts to Islam." Bosnian King Stefan Tomasevic to Pope Pius II "...The Porte
treated him (the patriarch) as part of the Ottoman political apparatus.
As a result, he had certain legally protected privileges. The Patriarch
travelled in 'great splendour' and police protection was provided
by the Janiccaries. His horse and saddle were fittingly embroidered,
and at the saddle hung a small sword as a symbol of the powers bestowed
on him by the Sultan." Dusan
Kasic, "The Serbian Church under the Turks", Belgrade, 1969
Still, compared to other Ottoman exploits (in Anatolia, for instance), the conquest of the Balkan was a benign affair. Cities remained intact, the lands were not depopulated and the indiscriminately ferocious nomadic tribesmen that usually accompanied the Turkish forces largely stayed at home. The Ottoman bureaucracy took over most aspects of daily life soon after the military victories, bringing with it the leaden stability that was its hallmark. Indeed, populations were dislocated and re-settled as a matter of policy called "sorgun". Yet such measures were intended mainly to quell plangent rebelliousness and were applied mainly to the urban minority (for instance, in Constantinople). The Church was
an accomplice of the Turkish occupiers. It was a part of the Ottoman
system of governance and enjoyed both its protection and its funding.
It was leveraged by the Turk sultans in their quest to pacify their
subjects. Mehmet II bestowed upon the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,
its bishops and clergy great powers. The trade off was made explicit
in Mehmet's edicts: the Church accepted the earthly sovereignty of
the sultan - and he, in turn, granted them tolerance, protection and
even friendship. The Ottoman religious-legal code, the Seriat, recognized
the Christian's right to form their own religiously self-governing
communities. These communities were not confined to the orderly provision of worship services. They managed communal property as well. Mehmet's benevolence towards the indigents was so legendary that people wrongly attributed to him the official declaration of a "Millet i Rum" (Roman, or Greek, nation) and the appointment of Gennadios as patriarch of the Orthodox Church (which only an episcopal synod could do). The Ottoman Empire was an amazing hybrid. As opposed to popular opinion it was not a religious entity. The ruling elite included members of all religions. Thus, one could find Christian "askeri " (military or civil officials) and Muslim "reaya" ("flock" of taxpayers). It is true that Christians paid the arbitrarily set "harac" (or, less commonly, "cizye") in lieu of military service. Even the clergy were not exempt (they even assisted in tax collection). But both Christians and Muslims paid the land tax, for instance. And, as the fairness, transparency and predictability of the local taxmen deteriorated - both Muslims and Christians complained. The main problem
of the Ottoman Empire was devolution - not centralization. Local governors
and tax collectors had too much power and the sultan was too remote
and disinterested or too weak and ineffective. The population tried
to get Istanbul MORE involved - not less so. The population was financially fleeced as much by the Orthodox Church as it was by the sultan. A special church-tax was levied on the Christian reaya and its proceeds served to secure the lavish lifestyles of the bishops and the patriarch. In true mob style, church functionaries divided the loot with Ottoman officials in an arrangement known as "peskes". Foreign powers contributed to the war chests of various candidates, thus mobilizing them to support pro-Catholic or pro-Protestant political stances and demands. The church was a thoroughly corrupt, usurious and politicized body which contributed greatly to the ever increasing misery of its flock. It was a collaborator in the worst sense of the word. But the behaviour of the church was one part of the common betrayal by the elite of the Balkan lands. Christian landowners volunteered to serve in the Ottoman cavalry ("sipahis") in order to preserve their ownership. The Ottoman rulers conveniently ignored the laws prohibiting "zimmis" to carry weapons. Until 1500, the "sipahis" constituted the bulk of the Ottoman forces in the Balkan and their mass conversion to Islam was a natural continuation of their complicity. Other Christians guarded bridges or mountain passes for a tax exemption ("derbentci"). Local, Turkish-trained militias ("armatoles") fought mountain-based robber gangs (Serbian "hayduks", Bulgarian "haiduts", Greek "klephts"). The robbers attacked Turkish caravans with the same frequency and zeal that they sacked Christian settlements. The "armatoles" resisted them by day and joined them by night. But it was perfectly acceptable to join Turkish initiatives such as this. The Balkan remained overwhelmingly Christian throughout the Ottoman period. Muslim life was an urban phenomenon both for reasons of safety and because only the cities provided basic amenities. Even in the cities, though, the communities lived segregated in "mahalles" (quarters). Everyone collaborated in public life but the "mahalles" were self-sufficient affairs with the gamut of services - from hot baths to prayer services - available "in-quarter". Gradually, the major cities, situated along the trade routes, became Moslem. Skopje, Sarajevo and Sofia all had sizeable Moslem minorities. Thus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the picture that emerges is one of an uneasy co-habitation in the cities and a Christian rural landscape. The elites of the Balkan - church, noblemen, warriors - all defected and collaborated with the former "enemy". The local populace was the victim of usurious taxes, coercively applied. The central administration shared the loot with its local representatives and with the indigenous elites - the church and the feudal landed gentry. It was a cosy and pragmatic arrangement that lasted for centuries. Yet, the seeds
of Ottoman bestiality and future rebellion were sown from the very
inception of this empire-extending conquest. The "devsirme"
tax was an example of the fragility of the Turkish veneer of humanity
and enlightened rule. Christian sons were kidnapped, forcibly converted
to Islam and trained as fighters in the fearsome Janiccary Corps (the
palace Guards). They were never to see their families and friends
again. Exemptions from this barbarous practice were offered only to select communities which somehow contributed to Ottoman rule in the Balkan. Christian women were often abducted by local Ottoman dignitaries. and the custom of the "kepin", allowed Moslems to "buy" a Christian daughter off her husband on a "temporary" basis. The results of such a union were raised as Moslems. And then there
were the mass conversions of Christians to Islam. These conversions
were very rarely the results of coercion or barbarous conduct. On
the contrary, by shrinking the tax base and the recruitment pool,
conversion were unwelcome and closely scrutinized by the Turks. But
to convert was such an advantageous and appealing act that the movement
bordered on mass hysteria. Landowners converted to preserve their
title to the land. "Sipahis" converted to advance in the
ranks of the military. Christian officials converted to maintain their
officialdom. Ordinary folk converted to avoid onerous taxes. Christian
traders converted to Islam to be able to testify in court in case
of commercial litigation. Converted Moslems were allowed to speak
Arabic or their own language, rather than the cumbersome and elaborate
formal Turkish. Christians willingly traded eternal salvation for
earthly benefits. And, of course, death awaited those who recanted
(like the Orthodox "New Martyrs", who discovered their Christian
origins, having been raised as Moslems). Perhaps this was because, in large swathes of the Balkan, Christianity never really took hold. It was adopted by the peasant as a folk religion - as was Islam later. In Bosnia, for instance, Muslims and Christians were virtually indistinguishable. They prayed in each other's shrines, celebrated each other's holidays and adopted the same customs. Muslim mysticism (the Sufi orders) appealed to many sophisticated urban Christians. Heretic cults (like the Bogomils) converted en masse. Intermarriage flourished, mainly between Muslim men (who could not afford the dowry payable to a Muslim woman) and Christian women (who had to pay a dowry to her Muslim husband's family). Marrying a Christian woman was a lucrative business proposition. And, then, of course, there was the Moslem birth rate. With four women and a pecuniary preference for large families - Moslem out-bred Christians at all times. This trend is most pronounced today but it was always a prominent demographic fact. But the success
of Islam to conquer the Balkan, rule it, convert its population and
prevail in it - had to do more with the fatal flaws of Balkan Christianity
than with the appeal and resilience of Islam and its Ottoman rendition.
In the next chapter I will attempt to ponder the complex interaction
between Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity as it was manifested
in Croatia and Bosnia, the border lands between the Habsburg and the
Ottoman empires and between "Rome" and "Byzantium".
I will then explore the variance in the Ottoman attitudes towards
various Christian communities and the reasons underlying this diversity
of treatment modalities. The Communities of God "From the beginning, people of different languages and religions were permitted to live in Christian lands and cities, namely Jews, Armenians, Ismaelites, Agarenes and others such as these, except that they do not mix with Christians, but rather live separately. For this reason, places have been designated for these according to ethnic group, either within the city or without, so that they may be restricted to these and not extend their dwelling beyond them."Bishop Demetrios Khomatianos of Ohrid, late 12th century and early 13th century AD "The Latins still have not been anathematized, nor has a great ecumenical council acted against them....And even to this day this continues, although it is said that they still wait for the repentance of the great Roman Church." "...Do not overlook us, singing with deaf ears, but give us your understanding, according to sacred precepts, as you yourself inspired the apostles....You see, Lord, the battle of many years of your churches. Grant us humility, quiet the storm, so that we may know in each other your mercy, and we may not forget before the end the mystery of your love....May we coexist in unity with each other, and become wise also, so that we may live in you and in your eternal creator the Father and in his only-begotten Word. You are life, love, peace, truth, and sanctity...."East European Studies Occasional Paper, Number 47, "Christianity and Islam in Southeastern Europe - Slavic Orthodox Attitudes toward Other Religions", Eve Levin, January 1997 "...you faced the serpent and the enemy of God's churches, having judged that it would have been unbearable for your heart to see the Christians of your fatherland overwhelmed by the Moslems (izmailteni); if you could not accomplish this, you would leave the glory of your kingdom on earth to perish, and having become purple with your blood, you would join the soldiers of the heavenly kingdom. In this way, your two wishes were fulfilled. You killed the serpent, and you received from God the wreath of martyrdom." Mateja Matejic and Dragan Milivojevic, "An Anthology of Medieval Serbian Literature in English", Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1978 Any effort to
understand the modern quagmire that is the Balkan must address religion
and religious animosities and grievances. Yet, the surprising conclusion
of such a study is bound to be that the role of inter-faith hatred
and conflict has been greatly exaggerated. The Balkan was characterized
more by religious tolerance than by religious persecution. It was
a model of successful co-habitation and co-existence even of the bitterest
enemies of the most disparate backgrounds. Only the rise of the modern
nation-state exacerbated long-standing and hitherto dormant tensions.
Actually, the modern state was established on a foundation of artificially
fanned antagonism and xenophobia. Religions in the Balkan were never monolithic enterprises. Competing influences, paranoia, xenophobia and adverse circumstances all conspired to fracture the religious landscape. Thus, for instance, though officially owing allegiance to the patriarch in Constantinople and the Orthodox "oikumene", both Serb and Bulgarian churches collaborated with the rulers of the day against perceived Byzantine (Greek and Russian) political encroachment in religious guise. The southern Slav churches rejected both the theology and the secular teachings of the "Hellenics" and the "Romanians" (Romans). In turn, the Greek church held the Slav church in disregard and treated the peasants of Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania to savage rounds of tax collection. The Orthodox, as have all religions, berated other confessions and denominations. But Orthodoxy was always benign - no "jihad", no bloodshed, no forced conversions and no mass expulsions - perhaps with the exception of the forcible treatment of the Bogomils. It was all about
power and money, of course. Bishops and archbishops did not hesitate
to co-opt the Ottoman administration against their adversaries. They
had their rivals arrested by the Turks or ex-communicated them. Such
squabbles were common. But they never amounted to more than a Balkanian
comedia del-arte. Even the Jews - persecuted all over western Europe
- were tolerated and attained prominence and influence in the Balkan.
One Bulgarian Tsar divorced his wife to marry a Jewess. Southern Orthodox
Christianity (as opposed to the virulent and vituperative Byzantine
species) has always been pragmatic. The minorities (Jews, Armenians, Vlachs) were the economic and financial backbone of their societies. And the Balkan was always a hodge-podge of ethnicities, cultures and religions. Shifting political fortunes ensured a policy of "hedging one's bets". The two great competitors of Orthodox Christianity in the tight market of souls were Catholicism and Islam. The former co-sponsored with the Orthodox Church the educational efforts of Cyril and Methodius. Even before the traumatic schism of 1054, Catholics and nascent Orthodox were battling over (lucrative) religious turf in Bulgaria. The schism was
a telling affair. Ostensibly, it revolved around obscure theological
issues (who begat the Holy Spirit - the Father alone or jointly with
the Son as well as which type of bread should be used in the Eucharist).
But really it was a clash of authorities and interests - the Pope
versus the patriarch of Constantinople, the Romans versus the Greeks
and Slavs. Matters of jurisdiction coalesced with political meddling
in a confluence of ill-will that has simmered for at least two centuries.
The southern (Slav) Orthodox churches contributed to the debate and
supported the Greek position. Sects such as the Hesychasts were more
Byzantine than the Greeks and denounced wavering Orthodox clergy.
Many a south Orthodox pilloried the Catholic stance as an heresy of
Armenian or Apollinarian or Arian origin - thus displaying their ignorance
of the subtler points of the theological debate. They also got wrong
the Greek argumentation regarding the bread of the Eucharist and the
history of the schism. But zeal compensated for ignorance, as is often
the case in the Balkan. What started as a debate - however fervent - about abstract theology became an all out argument about derided customs and ceremonies. Diet, dates and divine practices all starred in these grotesque exchanges. The Latin ate unclean beasts. They used five fingers to cross themselves. They did not sing Hallelujah. They allowed the consumption of dairy products in Lent. The list was long and preposterous. The parties were spoiling for a fight. As is so often the case in this accursed swathe of the earth, identity and delusional superiority were secured through opposition and self-worth was attained through defiance. By relegating them to the role of malevolent heretics, the Orthodox made the sins of the Catholics unforgivable, their behaviour inexcusable, their fate sealed. At the beginning, the attacks were directed at the "Latins" - foreigners from Germany and France. Local Catholics were somehow dissociated and absolved from the diabolical attributes of their fellow-believers abroad. They used the same calendar as the Orthodox (except for Lent) and similarly prayed in Church Slavonic. The only visible difference was the recognition of papal authority by the Catholics. Catholicism presented a coherent and veteran alternative to Orthodoxy's inchoate teachings. Secular authorities were ambiguous about how to treat their Catholic subjects and did not hesitate to collaborate with Catholic authorities against the Turks. Thus, to preserve itself as a viable religious alternative, the Orthodox church had to differentiate itself from the Holy See. Hence, the flaming debates and pejorative harangues. The second great threat was Islam. Still, it was a latecomer. Catholicism and Orthodoxy have been foes since the ninth century. Four hundreds years later, Byzantine wars against the Moslems were a distant thunder and raised little curiosity and interest in the Balkan. The Orthodox church was acquainted with the tenets of Islamic faith but did not bother to codify its knowledge or record it. Islam was, to it, despite its impeccable monotheistic credentials, an exotic Oriental off-shoot of tribal paganism. Thus, the Turkish invasion and the hardships of daily life under Ottoman rule found Orthodoxy unprepared. It reacted the way we all react to fear of the unknown: superstitions, curses, name calling. On the one hand, the Turkish enemy was dehumanized and bedevilled. It was perceived to be God's punishment upon the unfaithful and the sinful. On the other hand, in a curious transformation or a cognitive dissonance, the Turks became a divine instrument, the wrathful messengers of God. The Christians of the Balkan suffered from a post traumatic stress syndrome. They went through the classical phases of grief. They started by denying the defeat (in Kosovo, for instance) and they proceeded through rage, sadness and acceptance. All four phases co-existed in Balkan history. Denial by the many who resorted to mysticism and delusional political thought. That the Turks failed for centuries to subdue pockets of resistance (for instance in Montenegro) served to rekindle these hopes and delusions periodically. Thus, the Turks (and, by extension, Islam) served as a politically cohering factor and provided a cause to rally around. Rage manifested through the acts against the occupying Ottomans of individuals or rebellious groups. Sadness was expressed in liturgy, in art and literature, in music and in dance. Acceptance by conceiving of the Turks as the very hand of God Himself. But, gradually, the Turks and their rule came to be regarded as the work of the devil as it was incurring the wrath of God. But again, this
negative and annihilating attitude was reserved to outsiders and foreigners,
the off-spring of Ishmael and of Hagar, the Latins and the Turks.
Moslem or Catholic neighbours were rarely, if ever, the target of
such vitriolic diatribes. External enemies - be they Christian or
Moslem - were always to be cursed and resisted. Neighbours of the
same ethnicity were never to be punished or discriminated against
for their religion or convictions - though half-hearted condemnations
did occur. The geographical and ethnic community seems to have been
a critical determinant of identity even when confronted with an enemy
at the gates. Members of an ethnic community could share the same
religious faith as the invader or the heretic - yet this detracted
none from their allegiance and place in their society as emanating
from birth and long term residence. These tolerance and acceptance
prevailed even in the face of Ottoman segregation of religious communities
in ethnically-mixed "millets". This principle was shattered
finally by the advent of the modern nation-state and its defining
parameters (history and language), real or (more often) invented. One could sometimes find members of the same nuclear family - but of different religious affiliation. Secular rulers and artisans in guilds collaborated unhesitatingly with Jews, Turks and Catholics. Conversions to and fro were common practice, as ways to secure economic benefits. These phenomena were especially prevalent in the border areas of Croatia and Bosnia. But everyone, throughout the Balkan, shared the same rituals, the way of life, the superstitions, the magic, the folklore, the customs and the habits regardless of religious persuasion. Where religions co-existed, they fused syncretically. Some Sufi sects (mainly among the Janiccary) adopted Catholic rituals, made the sign of the cross, drank alcohol and ate pork. The followers of Bedreddin were Jews and Christians, as well as Moslems. Everybody shared miraculous sites, icons, even prayers. Orthodox Slavs pilgrims to the holy places in Palestine were titled "Hadzi" and Moslems were especially keen on Easter eggs and holy water as talismans of health. Calendars enumerated the holidays of all religions, side by side. Muslim judges ("kadis") married Muslim men to non-Muslim women and inter-marriage was rife. They also married and divorced Catholic couples, in contravention of the Catholic faith. Orthodox and Catholic habitually intermarried and interbred. That this background yielded Srebrenica and Sarajevo, Kosovo and Krajina is astounding. It is the malignant growth of this century. It is the subject of our next instalment.
|
 |
|
|